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respond to collective euphoria, emotional hyperbole, ir-
rational excessiveness and herd behaviour resulting from 
rumours or from viral effects. Financial markets have trig-
gered an unprecedented financial crisis that will continue 
to proliferate for as long as excess liquidities in currency, 
resource and government bond markets attack the system 
at its weak points.
Friedrich August von Hayek’s reflections are exemplary theo-
retical justifications for the «language of the market». Hayek 
argues that modern societies have evolved from a reliance on 
substantive moral imperatives and religious convictions that 
guided individual behaviour to formal regulation by the market. 
He avers that exposure to market competition in the exchange 
of goods produces an optimal satisfaction of needs and pro-
vides a fair balance of interests, but only under conditions of 
perfect competition, when private property is protected and 
the freedom of contract guaranteed. For the most part, Hayek 
omits that competition in and of itself does not guarantee com-
petition, private property has to be ensured through the law 
and contractual loyalty results from a particular set of morals. 
The «language of the market» is a language of asymmetrically 
distributed power. Financial markets do not only include mil-
lions of small shareholders, they also encompass institutional 
intermediaries, insurance and investment companies, and are 
determined by large banks. The banking system has unlim-
ited power to create money and value from nothing. Generally 
speaking, only those who have the necessary purchasing 
power and robust performance capabilities are able to survive 
in the market. 
The language of solidariTy
The language of solidarity is different to the language of the 
market. In the meaning deployed here, solidarity does not 
refer to personal virtues of empathy, charity or sympathy, 
but to social tax reforms that – like love or passion in a part-
nership, money in an economy, power in politics or truth in 
science – can align the actions of individuals to those of oth-
ers. Tax reforms based on solidarity enable a legally binding 
balance between unequally distributed social risks and in-
terests. Solidarity as tax reform encompasses the following 
characteristics. Firstly, there needs to be a sense of common-
The European Union is beside itself – not with excitement 
but with worry, and because of unrest and feelings of help-
lessness. Many people doubt whether financial and political 
elites are equipped to deal with the financial and debt cri-
ses European countries face, or indeed whether the existing 
capitalist system can be justifiably used to tackle these crises 
simply because it was successful on the level of systemic 
competition. 
The language of The markeT
Politicians feel they are at the mercy of the «language of the 
market». When the chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (appointed by the US Senate) asked a former 
banker whether they had sleepless nights knowing what 
they had done, the former banker replied that whilst he was 
sorry, he did not see why bankers should be held responsible. 
Correspondingly, one of his colleagues explained that things 
got complicated when the music stopped, but as long as it 
was still playing, one had to get up and dance. Josef Ack-
erman, chief executive of Deutsche Bank, has interpreted 
this to mean that everyone is now in some way driven by 
markets. The former head of the German Federal Bank, Hans 
Tietmeyer, tried to convey this to a German bishop by equat-
ing the rules of the market with natural laws. In the same way 
that water does not flow up-hill, market competition cannot 
be offset by parliamentary decisions or by appeals to morality. 
However, the rules and mechanisms of the market are neither 
a tsunami nor an earthquake. Economic systems, policies 
and technologies all stem from decisions that people actively 
make, even when these decisions then seemingly take on a 
life of their own or end up contradicting original intentions 
or points of view. Due to the fact that these systems are the 
result of human intervention, they can also be redesigned and 
corrected by human intervention.
The «language of the market» is a populist interpretation of 
the dogma of economic liberalism and its fixation on the mar-
ket. This is a dogma that attributes information efficiency to 
financial markets, convinced that market prices deliver au-
thentic signals about the opportunities and risks of particular 
assets. Yet, since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem, it has been repeatedly apparent that financial markets 
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2ality based on an objective rationale that is freely consented 
to. The bases for commonality can be class, gender, common 
origins, history, language, culture, religion or a collectively 
experienced fate. Secondly, at present, even where a sense 
of commonality exists within a nation-state, there are still 
stark inequalities in the distribution of risk; these risks involve 
poverty in old age, illness, the need for care, and in a trans-
national context they include socio-economic factors that 
influence living conditions. Thirdly, the reciprocal rights and 
duties balancing different interests need to be guaranteed 
constitutionally or by international agreements that are le-
gally binding. Fourth, commonality in the face of an unequal 
distribution of risk necessitates an asymmetrical reciprocity: 
contributions in accordance with ability, claims for assistance 
in accordance with the acuteness of need.
In contrast to market regulation, solidarity as tax reform has 
particular advantages. The market reconciles divergent in-
terests in an anonymous and limitless way. It depends upon 
a strict reciprocity of immediate, or at least foreseeable, quid 
pro quo. However, solidarity aims at striking a balance be-
tween the different interests within a demarcated group. 
Reciprocal contributions and claims to assistance are based 
on future expectations and subjective judgements of the ef-
fects of particular social risks. The «secret» of solidarity lies 
in how the less weak vouch for the weaker, the less poor 
for the poorer and those who are sick less often for those 
who are sick more often. The market cannot recognise this 
kind of asymmetrical reciprocity because the market relies 
on the equivalence between commodities and on the signals 
of individual output and purchasing power. Like the market, 
solidarity produces a reciprocal relationship. But unlike the 
market, this relationship is asymmetrical because the unequal 
distribution of social risk is countered by the maxim of justice 
founded on the principle of equality. Following this, all mem-
bers of a nation-state or of the European Union should have 
the right to equal treatment and respect. 
moneTary solidariTy
Financial crises are part of capitalism in the same way that 
water composes the sea. Since the breakdown of the Bret-
ton Woods system there have been at least six or seven fi-
nancial crises that have been caused by a variety of factors. 
These include: tax reforms of commodity and asset markets; 
explosive lending; debt financing and the limited liability of 
corporations; the power of the banking system to create both 
money and credit; a micro-level perspective that fixates on 
credit and institutional risks whilst disregarding systemic risk; 
and sheer negligence with respect to governmental oversight 
and control. Financial capital may have contributed to the 
obvious increase in global wealth, but one cannot ignore its 
destructive dynamics rooted in the disproportionate influence 
that creditor and debtor relations have on the real economy.
There is no need for the international community to reinvent 
a way out of the debt crisis. In 1983, forty developing and 
newly emerging economies went bankrupt. After the drastic 
increase in oil prices in 1973 and 1980 following the depre-
ciation of the US Dollar, the then flourishing international 
financial institutions transformed the excess liquidity origi-
nating from oil-exporting countries into low interest loans for 
developing and newly emerging economies. In 1981, abrupt 
changes to taxation in US-American monetary policy meant 
a radical increase in interest rates, making it impossible for in-
debted countries to repay their loans. In 1983, Brazil declared 
that it would stop its interest payments. Much later, in 2001, 
Argentina took the same decision. 
The way this crisis was managed on an international level 
meant that twenty-one developing countries signed debt-
restructuring agreements. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) brokered agreements between the indebted coun-
tries and the private and public banks. Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) did not formally declare bankruptcy and 
short-term credit was made available to tide them over. With 
the promise of fresh credit, long-term debt was repackaged, 
loosening repayment obligations and extending repayment 
dates. The IMF guaranteed the credit rating of developing 
countries, mobilised private and public credit and imposed 
contentious structural adjustment policies on indebted coun-
tries. These policies were contentious because they followed 
the monetarist demand-orientated dogma of the so-called 
«Washington Consensus». They included the stimulation of 
private investment and export-led growth, the rigorous con-
tainment of inflation, as well as drastic cuts to food subsidies, 
wages and social welfare provisions.
The devastating consequences of these policies for the lower 
strata of populations in developing countries revealed the 
shortcomings of such debt restructuring agreements. Indebt-
ed countries were unable to export to industrial countries to 
an extent that would have made it possible for them to repay 
their debt in foreign currencies. Case by case negotiations 
between consortia of creditors and the individual indebted 
countries did not take place on a level playing field, prevent-
ing any kind of fair burden-sharing. To date, there is neither 
an international insolvency law nor an independent body to 
ensure the fair reconciliation of interests.
Consequently, at the end of the 1980s there were proposals 
for a more sustainable regulation of the debt crisis with plans 
to develop an international insolvency law and a public debt 
agency to buy all of the debt from the private banks at a dis-
counted rate and organise a restructuring of this debt with 
the indebted countries. The IMF, the World Bank, regional 
development banks and private banks were supposed to act 
in concert to make multilateral financial help available and 
enable growth-promoting investment. In turn, the IMF would 
offer financial means for creditors to engage in voluntary ne-
gotiations with debtor countries over their debt restructuring. 
Only as a final measure would debt relief be considered.
federal solidariTy
According to Article 20 par. 1 of the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Germany is a democratic and social 
federal state. The functions of government are divided be-
tween the state and the individual Länder, a division of labour 
that serves to mitigate tensions between regional cultural 
diversity and overall territorial unity. There is even an «Eternity 
Clause» that makes it inadmissible to amend the Law in ways 
that affect the division of the Federation into Länder [Article 
79]. According to Article 72 par. 2, the Federation has the 
right to legislate in specific areas, «if and to the extent that 
the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the 
federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity 
renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.» 
The maxim of establishing equal living conditions throughout 
3the federal territory gives the imperative of the social state a 
spatial dimension. Access to social services, employment 
and adequate living standards are supposed to enable eve-
ryone across the country to participate in the economy and 
society. Federal solidarity thus poses a structural counter-
weight to centralising tendencies and to the hollowing out 
of peripheral regions.
According to Article 106 par. 3 No. 2 «the financial require-
ments of the Federation and of the Länder shall be coor-
dinated in such a way as to establish a fair balance, avoid 
excessive burdens on taxpayers, and ensure uniformity of 
living standards throughout the federal territory.» Article 107 
par. 2 states the law «shall ensure a reasonable equalisation 
of disparate financial capacities of the Länder.» Moreover, 
it «specifies the conditions governing the claims of Länder 
entitled to equalisation payments and the liabilities of Länder 
required to make them as well as the criteria for determining 
the amounts of such payments.» Aside from this horizontal 
financial balancing, the Federation may also provide grants to 
«financially weak Länder from its own funds to assist them in 
meeting their general financial needs.» The basic principles of 
spatial organisation are listed in Article 2 par. 2 of the Federal 
Regional Planning Act, which refers to the aim of balancing 
economic, infrastructural, social ecological and cultural rela-
tions across the respective areas of the Federation. A transfer 
union is thus not a point of contention within the German 
Federation and is guaranteed under Basic Law. 
However, Germany’s Basic Law has been infected with the 
market dogma of economic liberalism, which appeals to no-
tions of a self-healing market and trusts in the positive ef-
fects the market’s regulatory functions will have on all social 
institutions, on state administrative bodies and on the indi-
vidual Länder. As a result, the welfare state is mutating into a 
competition state. Competitive federalism dominates at the 
expense of cooperative federalism in an erosion of solidarity, 
most visible in the ways that constitutionally enshrined debt 
limits are used by financially stronger Länder against finan-
cially weaker Länder.
The European Union has no comparable guidelines for adjust-
ments that could establish that same standard of living across 
all member states. However, in accordance with Article 158 
of the EU Maastricht Treaty, the intention to do so does exist: 
«in order to promote its overall harmonious development, 
the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading 
to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion.» 
In particular, the legislation pursues the goal of «reducing 
disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions 
or islands, including rural areas.» According to Article 160 
of the Treaty, the task of the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund is to «redress the main regional imbalances in 
the Community through participation in the development 
and structural adjustment of regions whose development is 
lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial 
regions.» At present, a European transfer union merely ex-
ists in its infancy and is far from realisation. Nonetheless, 
it is currently receiving vehement criticism in the media by 
commentators usually regarded as intelligent, even though 
there are actually no objections to a transfer union if it does 
not exacerbate the tensions of the existing north-south divide 
within the European Union.
european solidariTy in The making
Existing attempts at regulating the foreign indebtedness of 
developing and newly emerging countries might have stalled 
at present, but generally they are not contested. What les-
sons can be learnt from these attempts and from attempts 
to consolidate federal solidarity within a national context? 
Firstly, we must return to the vision of one Europe for every-
one from the Atlantic to the Volga. Europe is and should be 
a political project, not just a technical or financial concern 
reduced to mere payment promises. The Marshall-Plan; the 
proclamation «Never again war, never again dictatorship!» 
that emerged in response to the loss of millions of lives dur-
ing the Second World War and was endorsed across a broad 
spectrum of actors and political parties; the Treaty of Rome; 
the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989; the sin-
gle European market; the expansion of the EU towards the 
south, north and east; the Maastricht Treaty and the Mon-
etary Union – all of these are cornerstones of a European 
architecture.
Secondly, the mistakes made in the construction of the 
Monetary Union need revising. The Monetary Union rests 
on two unstable pillars, namely the price level of goods and 
public budget adjustments. It may make sense for wealthy 
and aging societies to further the private accumulation of 
wealth and combat inflation whilst rigorously restricting 
public budgets in ways that in no way correspond to any 
laws of economic prudence. However, this is not so plausi-
ble for societies with youthful and growing populations. The 
European Central Bank’s instrument of choice has been a 
common nominal interest rate applicable across the whole 
of the EU. In the short-term, this produces uneven inter-
est rates due to disparities in levels of growth, inflation and 
wages; in the medium-term, it leads to regional imbalances, 
as well as structural deficits and the production of surplus 
on a national level.
Thirdly, to date the European Central Bank has paid scant 
attention to the explosive rise of asset prices, yet it has the ca-
pacity to implement a monetary policy that could stabilise the 
price level of goods. However, this would require a democrati-
cally legitimated counter-weight to be both functional and po-
litically justifiable. Yet, this kind of economic governance does 
not correspond to the present character of the EU because it 
is not a federal state. Nonetheless, there is a desperate need 
for the EU to coordinate and oversee policies in the areas of 
employment, growth, finance, tax, income and welfare in 
ways that can diffuse regional imbalances. A guiding princi-
ple here could be what was known as the «magic polygon» in 
the 1967 (West) German Law to Promote Economic Stability 
and Growth. On the level of the Federation and on the level 
of the Länder, governmental bodies had to take the needs of 
the whole economy into consideration in the economic and 
financial measures they endorsed. Within the framework of 
the market economy, these were supposed to stabilise price 
levels, increase employment, balance foreign trade and lead 
to continuous economic growth.
Fourth, the promotion of a relatively autonomous monetary 
sphere requires a European Stability and Growth Fund (in 
close collaboration with the European Central Bank) that can 
issue Eurobonds. This could combat the fears of US (in par-
ticular Wall Street) pressure having an overbearing effect on 
European decision-making, and could also placate the un-
4ease with the IMF's involvement in European rescue facilities, 
in a context where there is wide-spread skepticism of the 
IMF’s conversion to a «Post-Washington Consensus», i.e. to 
a more gentle formulation of the social elements of structural 
adjustment policies. 
Fifth, the state could be given interest-free credit for the 
provision of public goods, albeit under strict conditions. It 
is unacceptable that private banks pursuing returns on their 
investments additionally burden government budgets and 
deficits when lending money to the state.
Sixth, a robust stimulation of the real economy in the Euro-
zone should have a pull-effect on the financial sphere and its 
stabilisation, not vice versa. The G20 have repeatedly empha-
sised the equal importance of stabilising financial markets 
and stimulating the real economy. Yet, industrialised and 
newly industrialised countries have obviously followed dif-
ferent courses. The German Government has put consider-
able pressure on the EU to downplay the need to stimulate 
the real economy. Moreover, the arguments currently being 
put forward are ones that pre-date the financial crisis, for 
example the theory of an international division of labour, the 
logical elegance of which has a negative correlation with its 
practical relevance in the face of the Heksher-Ohlin model of 
international trade (i.e. a country will export products that use 
less costly and more abundant factors of production whilst 
importing ones that use scarce factors). Stronger countries 
put weaker countries under massive pressure and current 
policies lack any language of solidarity, evident in austerity 
measures that merely redistribute wealth from the bottom to 
the top and from the public to the private, in the stability pact, 
debt limits and the Euro Plus Pact.
Seventh, governmental bodies must endorse the language of 
solidarity to assist democratically legitimated decision-mak-
ers in regaining power over financial actors. The consent of 
the population to a European economic, monetary and social 
union is currently being undermined by lobbyists from central 
and private banks, insurance companies, capital investment 
companies, rating agencies and associations of swaps and 
derivative traders who obfuscate private interests with the 
«language of the market» as they both drive and deceive rep-
resentatives of sovereign states.
risks for european solidariTy
What pitfalls currently inhibit the regulation of the debt crisis 
of Europe’s peripheral states in ways that are premised upon 
solidarity?
Firstly, the prevalence of a short-term monetarist perspec-
tive. A perspective promoted by financial elites, it focuses 
debt management exclusively on the logic of creditor/debtor 
relations, masking both the state of the real economy and the 
political dimensions of opinion formation and decision-mak-
ing. Governmental bodies should not be threatened by the 
criteria of a supposedly information-efficient «language of the 
market», nor by rating agencies or swaps and derivative trad-
ers whose one-dimensional analysis rests on an exclusively 
binary-coded judgment, «can still pay/can no longer pay». 
Secondly, a belief in the immutability of financial hierarchies 
prevents European solidarity. Absolute interpretive control ap-
pears to lie with the private US-American rating agencies, fol-
lowed by the views publicly expressed by IMF and European 
Central Bank representatives with a special weighting of Ger-
man monetary watchdogs. In their shadows we encounter a 
financial-monetarist complex of international lobbyists, pri-
vate banks, insurances and investment funds.
Thirdly, governmental decision-makers appear to be over-
whelmed by the magnitude of the financial crisis. A politics 
reliant on the immediate state of play in current debates 
will succumb to incorrect and populist slander; for exam-
ple that Greek workers retire too early, have more holidays 
and shorter working hours than workers in Germany. When 
politicians return from summits informed and wiser, they be-
come embroiled in contradictions that confuse a population 
whipped up by the media. Do government administrators 
and other political representatives lack competence in fi-
nancial affairs? It is embarrassing to see the exact same civil 
servants now tasked with sorting out bank bail-outs and the 
overall debt crisis, who under the Red-Green and Black-Yel-
low (CDU-FDP) Coalitions were avidly involved with deregu-
lating the German financial system. Politicians can be held 
to ransom because they occupy the role of the collective 
hostage. Both the drama of bank bail-outs and the reaction 
to the debt crisis follow the same pattern: private banks and 
creditors are spared and the general public is burdened with 
the consequences of the crisis. In order to consolidate public 
budgets, low-income groups and the weaker EU member 
states are disproportionately burdened. We are still waiting 
for stricter regulations that involve the public oversight and 
control of all financial companies, financial transactions and 
financial centres. Political decision-makers are not stepping 
out of the vicious circle they got themselves into. Previously, 
public regulators, the European Central Bank, the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority and the Federal Ministry of 
Finance demanded that investment companies only held the 
highest ranking bonds in their efforts to protect investors, 
now they are all intimidated by the rating agencies. 
Fourth, rivalries amongst decision-makers hinder European 
solidarity. National governments, the IMF, the different com-
mittees of the European Union and the EU Commission are all 
in competition with one another. Like self-styled head teach-
ers, financially strong countries discipline financially weak 
ones. Whilst lobbyists of private banks put the blame on pub-
lic budgeting and governments, parliaments and courts on a 
national and European level all trip each other up.
Fifth, there seems to be no way of abating nonsensical theo-
ries that have only ever had limited plausibility – even before 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. Greece’s potential exit from 
the Monetary Union is only viewed from an isolated micro-
level perspective limited to calculating possible depreciation 
scenarios or a rapid improvement of global competition. In 
half-blind accounts, a country like Germany is caricatured as 
Europe’s mule when its export economy and population have 
benefited massively from the Monetary Union. Nobody dares 
estimate what the long-term costs of austerity measures, the 
current feverish round of privatisations within Europe (whilst 
Germany embarks on a process of «recommunalisation»), 
wage and welfare cuts or a shrinking Europe will be for the 
real economy.
Just how beneficial European solidarity would be is visible 
where mere market regulation fails: where a common bond 
connects members and member states who put equality be-
fore the differences that divide them; where there is an equal 
distribution of social and national risks that are not attributed 
5to individuals or individual countries but shouldered by eve-
ryone, especially stronger countries; where stronger coun-
tries pay according to their ability and where weaker ones are 
given support in accordance with their needs; where stronger 
countries are attentive to how they treat weaker countries. 
European solidarity is not free, but the cracks, divisions and 
polarisations in Europe that are caused by the market are 
much more costly. This is because the «language of the mar-
ket» creates a Europe for the few – the language of solidarity 
on the other hand creates a Europe for everyone.
This is an edited version of a presentation by Friedhelm Hengs-
bach SJ at a joint event of the German Political Foundations in 
Brussels together with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation on  
21st June 2011.
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